Illusory correlation and cognitive processes: a multinomial model of source-monitoring by Francesco Bulli & Caterina Primi
Review of Psychology,  
2006, Vol. 13, No. 2, 95-102 UDC 159.9 
95
The formation of illusory correlation is a mechanism of 
stereotype development which has largely been studied in 
adults, but until recently has not received attention from a 
developmental standpoint. Illusory correlation refers to an 
erroneous inference about the relationship between the two 
categories of events that are not correlated or are correlated 
to a lesser degree than one perceives (Chapman, 1967). In the 
classic illusory correlation paradigm (Hamilton & Gifford, 
1976, Experiment 1) people read 26 statements describing 
the behaviors of individuals belonging to a group (A) and 13 
statements describing behaviors of individuals belonging to 
another group (B). Although the ratio of favourable to un-
favourable behaviors was the same for both groups, people 
perceived an association between the minority group (nu-
merically smaller) and behaviors occurring less frequently 
(undesirable behaviors). Specifically, an illusory correlation 
was observed on three measures: a) Group B received less 
favourable evaluative ratings, b) an inflated number of pre-
viously presented negative behaviors was assigned to Group 
B in the assignment task, and c) the frequency of negative 
behaviors in Group B was overestimated, whereas the esti-
mated frequency of negative behaviors in group A was more 
correct.
Distinctiveness-based account. Hamilton and Gifford 
(1976) explained the effect of illusory correlation in terms of 
the biased encoding of infrequently occurring information. 
The co-occurrence of infrequent, and therefore distinctive, 
events was supposed to draw particular attention and to lead 
to better encoding. That is, members of the minority Group 
B performing undesirable behaviors should be particularly 
salient, and the increased attention to these distinctive and 
paired events should result in deeper encoding of the rela-
tionship between the minority group and negative behaviors. 
As a result, these events are assumed to be particularly well 
represented in memory, leading to the enhanced availability 
at retrieval (Hamilton, Dugan, & Trolier, 1985) and, thereby, 
to biases in judgments (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).
Illusory correlations in children. Despite two decades 
of research on illusory correlation in adults and the impor-
tant implications of this phenomenon for understanding the 
development of stereotypes, research on the development 
of illusory correlation in children has just begun to emerge. 
To investigate illusory correlations in children, Primi and 
Agnoli (2002) followed Hamilton and Gifford’s paradigm 
but adapted it to the capacities of children. Participants 
were shown drawings of 15 positive behaviors and 6 nega-
tive behaviors performed by members of a majority group, 
called Pines, or a minority group, called Firs. There were 
10 descriptions of desirable behaviors ascribed to members 
of Group Pines, whereas 4 statements specified undesirable 
behaviors of Group Pine members; in Group Firs, there 
were 5 desirable and 2 undesirable behaviors; thus, the ratio 
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of positive to negative behaviors was the same (5:2). After 
viewing all 21 drawings, participants performed three tasks 
similar to those used by Hamilton and Gifford (1976), yet 
simpler. They rated each of the groups on many qualitative 
dimensions (evaluation task). They attributed behaviors to 
the minority or majority group by placing a drawing depict-
ing each behavior in a majority-group box or a minority 
group-box (assignment task). Finally, they estimated the 
frequency of negative behaviors by removing cards from a 
stack (estimation task). Primi and Agnoli reasoned that if 
illusory correlation is due to an information processing bias 
in which shared infrequency makes minority-negative be-
haviors more salient, then children should form the illusory 
correlation similar to adults.
All three tasks provided consistent evidence that children 
also perceive the illusory correlation. Participants rated the 
majority group significantly higher than the minority group 
on the evaluation task. They significantly overestimated the 
number of minority group members who behaved badly, 
resulting in a significant correlation of group membership 
and the type of behavior. They also overattributed nega-
tive behaviors to the minority group. Interestingly, children 
remembered the items comprising the negative behaviors 
assigned to the minority group above chance level. These 
data are congruent with adults’ models of illusory correla-
tion positing that distinctive information is salient, receives 
more encoding and becomes more accessible in later judg-
ments (Hamilton & Sherman, 1989; McConnell, Sherman, 
& Hamilton, 1994).
Another study in line with the distinctiveness-based ex-
planation is the one by Johnston & Jacobs (2003). The goals 
of this study were to provide a conceptual replication of Pri-
mi and Agnoli’s (2002) findings of an illusory correlation 
between a minority social group and negative behaviors and 
to extend the investigation by including conditions in which 
both positive and negative behaviors are infrequent. In ad-
dition, the authors explored the role of memory for specific 
group-behaviors pairs.
Johnston and Jacobs (2003) showed participants a se-
ries of stimulus items, each of which described a member 
of one of two groups of fictitious children (“blue” group 
or “red” group) exhibiting either a positive (e.g., making 
good grades) or a negative (e.g., cheating at games) behav-
ior. The majority group was twice as large as the minority 
group. In fact, the terms majority and minority refer only to 
the relative size of the groups and not to social categories, 
such as sex or ethnicity. The proportion of items describ-
ing positive and negative behaviors was the same for each 
group (2:1). Besides completing three standard tasks to as-
sess their perceptions of illusory correlation between group 
membership and behavior type, children in this study were 
measured on verbal memory. This experiment provided evi-
dence that children are indeed susceptible to illusory corre-
lation between minority groups and infrequently occurring 
behaviors.
Both Primi and Agnoli (2002) and Johnston and Jacobs 
(2003) showed that children, like adults, remembered bet-
ter the cell containing the statistically infrequent data, sug-
gesting that these infrequent stimuli were more salient or 
distinctive to participants.
Overview of the present experiment. The present article 
investigates how the application of a multinomial source-
monitoring model to the illusory correlation paradigm (see 
Klauer & Meiser, 2000) in children can shed light on the 
cognitive processes underlying illusory correlations. To ap-
ply a multinomial model of source-monitoring to the illuso-
ry correlation paradigm the assignment task was considered 
as an instance of so-called source-monitoring.
Source-monitoring concerns the ability to remember 
the origin of information acquired earlier and it is a popular 
research area that has been applied to many issues, includ-
ing eyewitness memory, aging and amnesia (see Johnson, 
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993, for a review). In a typical 
source-monitoring experiment, participants are presented 
with items that come from two different sources. This is fol-
lowed by a memory test in which subjects are presented with 
old items and new distractors and have to identify not only 
which items were originally showed, but also the source of 
these items.
Conventional empirical measures of source-monitoring 
are frequently misleading and problematic to interpret: in 
fact they confound memory item memory and source mem-
ory and they cannot separate the source sensitivity from the 
response bias with regard to the source (Batchelder & Riefer, 
1990). Multinomial models of source monitoring suggest 
solving this problem by providing independent, theoretical-
ly motivated, parameters for the measurement of different 
factors (item memory, source memory and response bias) 
that can contribute to performance in a source-monitoring 
task (Bayen, Murnane, & Erdfelder, 1996).
Therefore a source-monitoring analysis of the assign-
ment task allows one to disentangle memory and guessing 
processes in item recognition and source attributions and, 
thus, to assess the roles of different memory processes and 
response bias involved in the illusory correlation. Particular-
ly, the capability of the source-monitoring theory to account 
for both types of memory independently (item memory and 
source memory) allows one to agree or reject the assump-
tion that illusory correlation is mediated by a selective ad-
vantage of the twice infrequent events.
METHOD
Participants
A total of 158 children (M age = 10.8; SD = 1.7) partici-
pated, ranging from 8 to 13 years of age. The children were 
from a public elementary school and a public middle school 
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in the Tuscany region of Italy. The participants included 78 
boys and 80 girls.
Materials 
The material was similar to the Primi and Agnoli (2002) 
experiment. A list of 21 statements formed the stimulus 
items. Each stimulus item consisted of initials, a group des-
ignation (Pines or Firs) and a behavior (positive or nega-
tive). For example, “R. from the Pines group throws rocks 
at animals ”.
Arbitrarily, the Pines group was labelled as larger or a 
majority group and the Firs group was labelled as the minor-
ity group: two-thirds of the children in the sentences were 
Pines (14) and one-third were Firs (7). In both groups, the 
ratio of positive to negative behaviors was the same - 5:2. 
Table 1 summarizes the number of positive and negative be-
haviors for both groups.
In order to analyse the illusory correlation paradigm 
and particulary the group attribution task as an instance of 
source-monitoring, we prepared an additional 21 stimuli. 
These items were based on interviews of children about 
good and bad behaviors. Ninety-five children (3rd to 7th 
grade) were interviewed individually. Each child was asked 
to imagine a child whom everyone would like, and describe 
his/her good behavior. Then each child was asked to imagine 
a child whom everyone would dislike, and describe his/her 
bad behavior. Of the 21 most frequently cited behaviors, 14 
positive behaviors and 7 negative behaviors were selected.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a quiet area of 
their school. All stimuli and tasks were presented on the 
screen of a personal computer by means of Flash MX soft-
ware1. Each session lasted for about 20 minutes.
Method and instructions followed the Primi and Agnoli 
(2002) experiment. Participants were told that they “shown 
on the computer screen they were about to see the sentences 
in which kids did certain thing; the kids belonged to two 
groups, one called Pines and the other called Firs”. The or-
der in which group names were mentioned was randomized. 
Each participant looked at a sample sentence that included 
the initials of a child and his/her behavior. In this example 
no group name appeared next to the initials; participants, 
however, were alerted that each child would be associated 
with either Pines or Firs group.
The 21 stimulus items were then presented on the com-
puter monitor with a duration of 7 seconds, and in a rand-
omized order for each participant. The experimenter read 
aloud the name, the membership group and the sentence 
describing a behavior. After viewing all 21 stimuli, par-
ticipants performed three tasks: 1) an evaluation task, 2) a 
source-monitoring task, and 3) a frequency estimation task. 
The order of presentation of the evaluation task and the 
group attribution task was counterbalanced. The frequen-
cy estimation task, instead, was always performed last for 
comparison with the studies of adult illusory correlation in 
which this task was always last.
Evaluation task
Participants were asked to rate the majority and minority 
groups with the respect to 14 pairs of bipolar adjectives. The 
adjectives were taken from Primi and Agnoli (2002). For 
each trait adjective a scale ranging from 1 (clicking next to 
the left word) to 5 (clicking next to the right word) was pro-
vided on the computer screen. The participants entered their 
responses by mouse clicks and they first rated one group 
on all of the adjective-pairs, then the other group, with the 
order of groups counterbalanced across participants.
Source-monitoring task
Unlike the Primi and Agnoli (2002) experiment, the as-
signment task was extended to a source-monitoring task 
with new behavior descriptions used as distractor items. 
Target items and distractors were drawn from a common 
pool of items.
The 14 positive and 7 negative target behaviors from the 
presentation phase (without group membership) were rep-
resented together with 14 positive and 7 negative distractor 
items that had not been presented before. Targets and dis-
tractors were shown in a random order that was determined 
for each participant anew. For each item, participants were 
first asked to decide whether the item was one they saw dis-
played during the presentation phase (response “yes”) or 
whether the item was new (response “no”). They entered 
their responses by clicking on an appropriately labelled but-
ton on the computer screen. If the participants responded 
“yes”, then they also had to indicate the item’s group origin 
(Pines or Firs) in a second step. Participants’ instructions 
Table 1
Distribution of behaviors (from Primi and Agnoli (2002) experiment)
Majority/Pines Minority/Firs Total
Positive behaviors 10 5 15
Negative behaviors 4 2 6
Total 14 7 21
1 The use of personal computer was a difference compared with Primi 
and Agnoli (2002) experiment. Therefore, in the pilot study we exam-
ined weather the use of computer would effect the illusory correlation 
phenomenon and found no difference among the procedures.
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were made to ensure that the item detection choice (decid-
ing yes or no) and the source discrimination choice (decid-
ing Pines or Firs) were treated as separate decisions (Klauer 
& Meiser, 2000).
Frequency estimation task
In this task, participants were presented the total number 
of members belonging to each of the two groups. They were 
instructed to drag into a basket as many members as the 
number of children who had performed negative behaviors. 
The presentation order of the two groups was randomized.
RESULTS
Evaluation task. If participants perceive an illusory 
correlation between group membership and behavior, they 
should rate the majority group (Pines) more positively than 
the minority group (Firs) on evaluative traits. The ratings 
were coded so that larger values corresponded to the better 
evaluations. They were then averaged for each participant, 
separately for the Pines and Firs groups. As expected, mem-
bers of group Pines received better evaluations (M = 3.5 ± 
1.0) than did members of group Firs (M = 3.1 ± 1.1) and this 
difference was significant (t(157) = 3.4, p < .01).
Source-monitoring task. The assignment frequencies of 
target items and distractors were calculated separately for 
positive and negative behaviors. Participants had three re-
sponse alternatives in the assignment task, resulting in two 
3 × 3 frequency tables, one for positive behaviors and the 
other for negative behaviors. Table 2 and Table 3 show the 
data matrices for the source-monitoring task.
Of the positive behaviors, 1113 (23.5%) were assigned 
to group Pines and 745 (15.7%) to group Firs. In contrast, 
of all the negative behaviors, 450 (23.7%) were assigned 
to group Pines and 436 (23.0%) to group Firs, indicating 
an illusory correlation between the group membership and 
the type of behavior. The ratios of assignments to Group 
Pines versus Firs were significantly different for positive 
and negative behaviors, as shown by χ2 test for equality of 
proportions (χ2(1) = 20.3, p < .0001).
The assignment frequencies were analyzed using multi-
nomial two-high threshold model of source-monitoring 
(Bayen, Murnane & Erdfelder, 1996). Two-high threshold 
models allow for both, the recognition of target items as old 
and the identification of distractor items as new. Figure 1 
shows processing-tree representation of the source-monitor-
ing model adapted for the illusory correlation paradigm on 
children.
The model assumes that participants’ responses to items 
in a source-monitoring task are a function of a series of hy-
pothetical cognitive processes: item detection (parameters 
D1, D2, D3), source discrimination (parameters d1, d2), and 
two response biases (parameters a, b). The model is repre-
sented by three processing trees, one for each of the three 
sources of behaviors, that is, behaviors referring to mem-
bers of group Pines, those referring to Firs members and 
new behaviors.
The model assumes that participants detect whether an 
item is old with D1 probability for group Pines behaviors, 
D2 for group Firs behaviors. With the D3 probability, the 
distractor items are correctly discriminated as new items. 
If an old item is detected as old, then d1 and d2 measured 
the capacity to discriminate the source of old Pines and Firs 
behaviors, respectively.
If discrimination of the source of an old item fails (with 
a probability 1 – di, i = 1, 2), then only a guessing process, 
measured by parameter a, determines the source assign-
ment. With an a probability, the item is assigned to group 
Pines; with a complementary probability 1 – a, the item is 
assigned to group Firs.
If item memory fails (with a probability 1 – Di, i = 1, 2, 
3), the model assumes that participants can guess whether 
the behavior is old or new. The probability of guessing old 
is given by the bias parameter b. If participants guess that 
the behavior is old, the same guessing process (measured by 
parameter a) determines which source the item is assigned 
to. With an a probability, the item is assigned to group Pines; 
with a complementary 1 – a probability, the item is assigned 
to group Firs. If, on the other hand, participants guess that the 
item is new, they respond “new” with a probability of 1 – b.
The model is designed to represent situations in which an 
observed response category can arise from one or more unob-
served cognitive steps, corresponding to branches in the tree 
Table 2
Data matrix for the source-monitoring task for positive behaviors
Response  
Source Pines Firs New Total 
Pines 689 413 478 1580
Firs 326 257 207 790
New 98 75 2197 2370
Total 1113 745 2882 4740
Table 3
Data matrix for the source-monitoring task for negative behaviors
Response
Source Pines Firs New Total
Pines 307 269 56 632
Firs 125 151 40 316
New 18 16 914 948
Total 450 436 1010 1896
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structure. Each cognitive process occurs with a defined prob-
ability and the probabilities of cognitive steps are represented 
by the model parameters. Thus, the multinomial model can 
be described as a system of equations, in which response cat-
egory probabilities are generally expressed as nonlinear func-
tions of the underlying psychological parameters.
In fitting the multinomial source-monitoring model to 
the data, the separate parameters for positive and negative 
items were used. The model in Figure 1 has a total of 14 
parameters (7 for each data matrix). The two data matrices 
provide 2 × 6 = 12 degrees of freedom, so that the model is 
overparametrized and then it is technically nonidentifiable. 
A way to handle the nonidentifiability problem is to impose 
restrictions on the parameters.
A restriction of interest (Bayen, Murnane & Erdfelder, 
1996) is to assume that D1 = D2 = D3 for both negative as 
well as positive items. The restriction includes the assump-
tion made for two-high threshold models that the prob-
Figure 1. Two-high threshold multinomial model of source monitoring applied to the illusory correlation paradigm on children
Note. Pines = group Pines behaviors; Firs = group Firs behaviors; New = distractor behaviors. The actual group membership is displayed on the left; the re-
sponse categories are displayed in the rectangles on the right. D1 = probability of detecting an item from group Pines as old; D2 = probability of detecting 
an item from group Firs as old; D3 = probability of detecting a distractor as a new; d1 = probability of correctly discriminating the source of an item from 
group Pines; d2 = probability of correctly discriminating the source of an item from group Firs; a = probability of guessing that a detected or undetected 
item is from group Pines; b = probability of guessing an item is old.
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abilities of correctly identifying targets and distractors are 
equal. Therefore, we began by setting D1 = D2 for positive 
and negative items, that is testing the statistical hypothesis 
that the probability of responding “new” for a group Pines 
item is the same as the probability of responding “new” for a 
group Firs item. This test can be performed using the χ2 test 
of equality of independent proportions. The hypothesis D1 
= D2 of equal item memory could not be maintained for the 
subtable with positive behaviors (χ2(1) = 4.21, p = .04). For 
the subtable with negative behaviors, the χ2 test of equality 
of independent proportions was not statistically significant 
(χ2(1) = 3.34, p = .06). It was right, however, to assume that 
the hypothesis of equal item memory could not be main-
tained for negative behaviors, too.
So in all models reported below we had to keep the 
parameters D1+ ; D2+ ; D1- ; D2- separate, that assumed the 
following values respectively .70; .74; .91;.872. Looking 
at these probabilities, it is clear that D2+ (item memory for 
group Firs positive behaviors) is higher than D1+ (item de-
tection for group Pines positive behaviors). Item discrimi-
nation for new positive behaviors, D3+ (.93), appears to be 
quite good. Likewise D1- is better than D2-, again D3- is good 
(.96). This prompted us to fit a model with two restrictions: 
D2+ = D3+ = D+ and D1- = D3- = D-. This model was identifi-
able (i.e., the parameters can be estimated), and saturated 
G2(0) = .00005.
We proceeded in a hierarchical search of a nested model 
with the better goodness of fit. The restrictions D2- = D- and 
D1+ = D+ could not be maintained. The loss in goodness of 
fit entailed by imposing these restrictions was significant 
(ΔG2(2) = 7.48, p = .02). The item memory parameters for 
positive items was smaller than that for negative items, in-
dicating a negativity effect in memory similar to that found 
in adults (Klauer & Meiser, 2000; Meiser & Hewstone, 
2001).
We tried a model in which all four source discrimina-
tion parameters were set equal to one common value d (in 
addition to the above restrictions on the item memory pa-
rameters), on the grounds that this restriction was possible 
in previous works (Bayen, Murnane & Erdfelder, 1996; 
Klauer & Meiser, 2000; Meiser, 2003; Meiser & Hewstone, 
2001). The four source memory parameters could be set 
equal without a significant loss in goodness of fit (ΔG2(3) = 
.89, p = .83), indicating that there was no differential source 
memory. The overall source memory parameter, d = .08, 
was significantly different from zero as shown by its 95% 
confidence interval (.04, .12).
The response bias parameter b was not different for 
positive and negative behaviors. The attempt to set the b 
parameters equal for positive and negative behaviors did not 
yield a significant loss in goodness of fit (ΔG2(1) = 2.53, p 
= .11).
Finally, the guessing bias in source discrimination (pa-
rameter a) showed an evaluative bias in that the tendency to 
assign positive items to group Pines (majority) is larger than 
the tendency to assign negative items to the same group, and 
the difference was significant (ΔG2(1) = 21.56, p < .0001).
Based on this pattern of significances, a simplified mod-
el was fitted to the empirical assignment frequencies shown 
in Table 2 and Table 3. The goodness of fit of the model 
was tested with the likelihood ratio G2 (Hu & Batchelder, 
1994), which is asymptotically chi-square distributed with 
four degrees of freedom. Specific hypotheses were estimat-
ed using the conditional likelihood-ratio statistic ΔG2. The 
critical value of the rejection of the model was determined 
by a statistical power analysis. This procedure was chosen 
to avoid the risks related to the use of conventional levels 
of significance in the goodness of fit tests (Erdfelder, Faul, 
& Buchner, 1996). The power analysis was conducted with 
the software GPOWER (Erdfelder et al., 1996) for 6636 ob-
servations (i.e. 42 responses from 158 participants), small 
effect size (ω = .10), four degrees of freedom, and equal-
ity of the statistical error probabilities α and β. The power 
analysis yielded a critical value of G2crit.(4) = 22.69, corre-
sponding to the error probabilities α = β = .0001. The em-
pirical likelihood ratio was much smaller, G2(4) = 3.42, p = 
.49, indicating an acceptable goodness of fit. Table 4 shows 
the resulting parameter estimates and their 95% confidence 
intervals.
2 Item detection parameters Dn (n=1, 2, 3) are the only parameters that 
may be calculated from data matrices for the source-monitoring task 
(D1 = 1 – p13; D2 = 1 – p23; D3 = p33).
Table 4
Parameter estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the final model of 
source-monitoring
Final Model
Parameter Estimate IC (95%)
D+ .67 (.63, .71)
D- .87 (.85, .89)
D1+ .61 (.57, .65)
D2- .84 (.80, .88)
d1 .08a (.04, .12)
d2+ .08a (.04, .12)
d1- .49 (.04, .12)
d2- .08a (.04, .12)
b+ .23b (.19, .27)
b- .23b (.19, .27)
a+ .60 (.58, .62)
a- .08a (.45, .53)
G2(4) = 3.42
Note. 1 = group Pines; 2 = group Firs; + = positive behaviors; - = negative 
behaviors; D+, D-, D1+, D2- = item detection parameters; d1+, d2+, d1-, 
d2- = source discrimination parameters; a+, a- = probability of guessing 
group Pines; b+, b- = probability of guessing that an item is old. Param-
eter estimates with the same subscript were restricted to be equal.
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Frequency estimation task. If participants perceive an il-
lusory correlation between the group membership and the 
behavior, they should overestimate the frequency of nega-
tive behaviors associated with the minority group. Partici-
pants had to estimate how many children in the majority 
and minority groups were engaged in negative behaviors. 
Participants estimated an average of 4.97 members from 
the group Pines and 3.68 members from the group Firs. To 
evaluate the strength of the illusory correlation, we calcu-
lated a phi correlation coefficient for each participant. Av-
eraging across all participants, mean phi equalls .17 and is 
significantly greater than zero (t(157) = 7.41, p < .0001). 
The participants’ estimates were consistent with the illusory 
correlation paradigm.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
All three tasks in this experiment provided consistent 
evidence that children perceive illusory correlation. Partici-
pants rated the majority group (Pines) significantly higher 
than the minority group (Firs). They significantly overesti-
mated the number of minority group members who exhib-
ited negative behaviors, resulting in a significant correlation 
between group membership and the type of behavior. The 
group attribution task differed slightly from the standard 
procedure. The assignment task, as an example of a source-
monitoring task, allowed the investigation od the roles of 
different memory processes and response bias involved in 
the illusory correlation paradigm, by means of a multino-
mial model.
With respect to item memory, a negativity bias was ob-
served so that there was a memory advantage for negative 
behaviors, similar to that pointed out in adults (Klauer & 
Meiser, 2000; Meiser & Hewstone, 2001). The reason may 
be that negative behaviors are inherently more salient than 
positive behaviors, therefore, attracting more attention than 
positive behaviors (Johnston, 2000). The negativity effect in 
memory is by itself not enough to explain the illusory cor-
relation. In contrast to what might be expected on the basis 
of the distinctiveness-account there was no better memory 
for the doubly infrequent negative minority group behaviors 
(parameter D2-).
With regard to source memory, no reliable differences 
were found as a function of the group origin and the type of 
behavior. In fact, the four source memory parameters (d1+, 
d2+, d1-, d2-) could be set equal without significant loss of 
goodness of fit. Thus the observed illusory correlation in the 
assignment task is caused neither by the differential item 
memory, differential source memory, nor a combination of 
both.
Ruling out the possibility that the illusory correlation 
was caused by memory processes, we analyzed the guess-
ing processes. As to parameter b (probability of guessing 
that an item is old) no differences were found as a function 
of the desirability of the behavior. Rather, illusory correla-
tion effect could be traced back to differential response bias 
in a source discrimination (parameter a) for positive and 
negative behaviors. When guessing the origin of a positive 
behavior, participants chose majority group (group Pines) 
rather than minority group (group Firs) with the probabil-
ity .60; when guessing the origin of a negative behavior, 
participants chose group Pines with a significantly smaller 
probability (.49).
How can the observed results be reconciled with the 
distinctiveness-based account? The distinctiveness account 
is questioned by the finding that illusory correlation occurs 
without the differential recognition or the source memory 
for the twice infrequent negative minority group behaviors 
(D2- and d2- parameters). In contrast to earlier research in 
children (Johnston & Jacobs, 2003; Primi & Agnoli, 2002) 
emphasizing the assumption that illusory correlation effect 
is mediated by a selective memory advantage of the twice 
infrequent events, we viewed the guessing bias involved 
in the source discrimination as in itself sufficient to create 
correlations between group membership and type of the be-
havior, even when they were non existant. If the distinc-
tiveness-based account appears to gain less support, the 
present experiment could be accommodated by the infor-
mation loss hypothesis (Fiedler, 1991). Fiedler argued that 
illusory correlation could arise because different amounts 
of information - about the proportion of positive and nega-
tive behaviors - describe majority and minority groups. It is 
the asymmetry in the frequency table itself, rather than the 
cognitive distinctiveness, that creates the illusory correla-
tion effect.
According to Fiedler (1991), unless information is proc-
essed without error, estimates of frequency will show re-
gression to the mean that is even stronger with the smaller 
sample because of the “law of large numbers”. This univer-
sal statistical principle argues that with increases in the size 
of the sample (n), sample mean distribution variability (σ2M 
= σ2 / n) is decreases untill it vanishes, or rather the sample 
mean becomes more representative of the population mean 
and sample mean agrees with population mean when n = 
N.
Although the ratio of positive to negative behaviors is the 
same for the majority group (10:4) and the minority group 
(5:2), there are twice as many observations to learn the cor-
rect proportion of frequencies in the former than in the latter 
case. The differential loss of information for the majority 
and minority groups should result in judgments that minor-
ity group is less positive than majority group when most 
behaviors are desirable (i.e. the typical illusory correlation 
effect). This effect emerges, however, without any differen-
tial processing of the infrequent items. Therefore, the lack 
of memory advantage for the minority group negative be-
haviors (as our experiment makes it clear) could be in line 
with the information loss hypothesis.
According to information loss account, illusory correla-
tion reflects memory impairment for the correct reproduc-
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tion of proportions at the group level and does not pertain 
directly to memory for specific items. Thus, participants 
who correctly assigned more positive items to the majority 
group than to the minority group may not remember a single 
item but merely rely on guessing, having noticed that posi-
tive items are associated with the majority group (Fielder, 
Russer, & Gramm, 1993).
We conclude that a source-monitoring analysis of illu-
sory correlation paradigm on children casts doubt on the 
distinctiveness account, and furthermore, on the possibility 
that the illusory correlation effect results from the increased 
salience of co-occurring distinctive stimuli.
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